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Abstract. This paper investigates the role of public expenditures and 
general government debt in microfinance performance. Our panel 
regression applied to the data of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Latin 
America and the Caribbean confirms the high significance of public 
finance for the growth of MFIs, especially for the size of their total assets 
and for their yield on gross loan portfolio. Moreover, the results indicate 
that MFIs, operating in the country with higher growth of GDP, are 
characterized by higher rate of social efficiency. The positive influence on 
microfinance is besides public finance also associated with a growth of 
rural population or an economy openness of the given country. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance is generally considered to be an expedient method of financing low income 
people in less developed countries (Khandker, 2005; Janda a Turbat, 2013). Financial aid 
based on microfinance services has been growing for more than 30 years as an addition to 
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government-controlled subsidies and social programmes for low income people. The original 
intention of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to offer low-volume loans to microenterprises 
with insufficient credit history or lack of assets to be used as collateral has been gradually 
extended to other products such as microinsurance, savings products and payment services. In 
1999 there were 159 MFIs recorded around the world managing a microcredit with a total 
volume of 1.8 billion USD. However, as of 2012 the number of these institutions has 
increased to 1,258 and their assets are made up of microcredit exceeding 99 billion USD 
(mixmarket.org). 
The current level of microfinance performance is to some extent caused by the size of 
public expenditures allocated by government authorities to microfinance industry in the form 
of subsidies, grants or government loans (Morduch, 1999). A number of empirical studies 
have confirmed that the involvement of a local government in reducing the rate of low income 
people in a country has a higher degree of efficiency if social projects are financed indirectly 
by the government through the microfinance market. Balkenhol (2007) and Robinson (2001) 
argue that the business model based on direct financing through a state-owned bank has 
proved to be very expensive and in most cases inefficient. The reason for this is mainly an 
inadequate choice of a target segment, consisting mainly of wealthier debtors instead of so-
called core poor. Another problem has been the price of loans which has usually been below 
the market interest rates and has not been covering costs. At the same time government loans 
have often been perceived by debtors as a donation, which have led to attempts to delay their 
repayment. Finally, government social programmes have been often characterized by a 
rigidity of their scope and insufficient level of subsequent services (e.g. savings products and 
payment services). 
Although the share of public expenditures in the microfinance sector is not officially 
published, according to data provided by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) the amount of government expenditures intended for social policy in the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been increasing annually on average by about 
4.6 per cent (between 1990 and 2011). The largest expenditures are reported in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic and Peru. The governments of 
individual countries represent a vital distribution channel for the allocation of financial capital 
coming from public and private sources. CGAP organization (Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor) states that the estimated amount of the financial resources allocated to the 
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development of the financial sector (including microfinance) in less developed countries has 
reached 29 billion USD in 2012 (an increase of 16 per cent compared to 2011) - 4.5 billion 
USD of this sum have been allocated through government organizations. CGAP also reports 
that the amount of resources intended for the countries of LAC has decreased from 2.3 billion 
USD in 2011 to 2.2 billion USD in 2012 due to the closure of several large projects. 
Researching existing literature we have not found any other more comprehensive studies 
examining the impact of rising public expenditures and the growing debt of local governments 
on microfinance sector in the context of macroeconomic development. One of the current 
problems of public finance is the issue of fiscal imbalance, which has been at the forefront 
especially after a financial crisis in 2008. International rating agencies monitor more strictly 
the economic activities of individual states including budget deficits and long-term ability to 
meet their obligations. The deterioration of public finance may in the future threaten generous 
state expenditures aimed at the development of the microfinance sector as well as the role of 
the state in the international transfer of capital from public and private donors and investors. 
Additionally, we may experience an instability in the macroeconomic environment whose 
development influences the growth of the microfinance sector (Vanroose, 2008; Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak, 2008; Montgomery and Weiss, 2011). Vanroose (2008) has found that MFIs 
operating in more developed countries with higher international assistance have a greater 
proportion of debtors in their loan portfolios. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) and 
Montgomery and Weiss (2011) have discovered that MFIs are more efficient in countries with 
a high share of agricultural production and higher inflation. 
Due to the lack of sufficient attention in existing literature this study aims to research the 
influence of government expenditures and government debt on the total size of the 
microfinance market, the number of debtors, risk operations, and profitability of MFIs. We 
are going to expand the amount of dependent variables by including an indicator of the total 
size of the assets held by the banking sector in order to analyze the impact of public 
expenditures on the microfinance sector as well as on the banking sector. The study is based 
on empirical data of 302 MFIs operating in 12 countries in LAC between 2006 and 2012. The 
macroeconomic environment of the individual countries will be compared based on the 
following indicators – GDP, Inflation, Rural population, Economic openness, Government 
expenditures and Government debt. The findings are meant to be used mainly by government 
authorities which intend to support the microfinance sector in the country that has experienced 
a long-term growth of the public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The final results of this 
study will be useful for investors and creditors who might be considering the allocation of 
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their financial capital to the microfinance sector. 
In order to achieve this objective, the article is structured as follows. The following 
section focuses on the current state of the microfinance market and explains how government 
authorities contribute to its future development. This section is followed by an empirical 
analysis of the panel data of MFIs operating in the region of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Finally, we present the results of our study and generalize some of the findings for 
possible future research. 
 
2. Microfinance Performance and the Role of Government 
 
The role of government in the initial development of the microfinance sector after 1980 has 
consisted mainly of high expenditures on business activities of non-profit MFIs in order to 
improve the living standards of low income people and to reduce the unemployment rate. 
However, government expenditures have not sufficiently covered the growing demand for 
microfinance services in the long term and MFIs need to achieve financial self-sustainability. 
A different approach of government authorities to establish legislative rules in less developed 
countries which allow commercialization of the microfinance sector and options to finance 
MFIs with private equity is subsequently reflected in the uneven development of the 
microfinance sector. The long-standing most developed microfinance region (Figure 1) is 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. North 
Africa and the Middle East (MENA) have reported slower development mainly due to the 
lack of capital, insufficient market transparency and religious and cultural traditions. 
Although microfinance services are quite accessible in developed countries as well, their 
social and financial efficiency is not as high as in less developed countries. Schreiner a Woller 
(2003) argue that the main reasons for this failure are in a different understanding of the core 
poor, social ties between debtors and a smaller size of the market for microenterprises. 
Additionally, outputs of these enterprises tend to resemble services rather than products and 
they are more demanding in terms of microenterprise management. Rather than microfinance 
regions they can be perceived as suitable providers of funds for the microfinance industry in 
less developed countries (Srnec et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the number of MFIs in the individual regions 
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Commercialization of the microfinance sector in the last 30 years has helped to uncover 
several rules that the government can follow in order to increase the efficiency of MFIs and to 
effectively reduce the share of low income people in less developed countries. According to 
Al Atoom and Abu Zerr (2012), Mendoza and Vick (2008), Duflos and Imboden (2004) and 
Ledgerwood (1998) the government’s involvement in the process should include creating a 
flexible regulatory framework and an efficient supervision of the microfinance market in 
order to improve its development and transparency. As well as to make capital markets more 
accessible for the MFIs and to increase the involvement of the private sector in financing the 
microfinance industry and the fight against poverty, last but not least to provide a stable 
macroeconomic environment using the tools of fiscal and monetary policy. The necessity to 
obey these rules as well as mutual cooperation of the microfinance sector with the 
government is especially important after the international UN summit in 2000 where several 
goals had been set (Millennium Development Goals) among which is an eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger (MDG-1) in member states by the year 2015. As Figure 2 shows, 
the share of core poor in the region of LAC decreases in the long-term particularly in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador and Honduras. Pérez et al. (2012) and Montgomery and Weiss (2011) have 
analyzed the impact of microfinance on achieving the goals of MDG-1 in Nicaragua and 
Pakistan. They have found out that the microfinance sector significantly contributes to both 
reduction of poverty as well as fulfilling the objectives related to external poverty. 
 
Figure 2: Population below $1 (PPP) per day, percentage 
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2.1 Microfinance and Regulation and Supervision 
 
The importance of regulation and monitoring of microfinance market is discussed by Ahmed 
et al. (2013), Ayayi (2012), Cull et al. (2011), Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007). These studies partially recognize the need to regulate and monitor MFIs in 
order to ensure oversight over the management of client deposits, higher efficiency of credit 
risk management, increasing the transparency of the microfinance sector as well as a 
protection of clients from MFI malpractices. Cull et al. (2011), however, point out that such 
regulation can be considerably costly particularly in the initial phase when setup of the 
reporting or training of employees is required. MFIs might respond to this kind of 
expenditures either by increasing the loans price or increasing the loans volume which will in 
effect impact the target segment. Another important finding is introduced by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). Both papers pinpoint the fact that the 
introduction of MFIs regulation results neither in social efficiency improvement nor in 
acceleration of their future development. Finally, Duval (2004) underlines the high occurrence 
of interest rate caps often used by local governments in order to regulate the client interest 
rates from microloans. 
 
 
2.2 Microfinance and Capital Markets 
 
Capital markets allow sustainable and profitable MFIs to access a funding source in the form 
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of public offering of its shares or long-term bonds without the need to rely on subsidies or 
grants. Another benefit of the public offering is the issuer’s ability to approach more 
investors/creditors in shorter periods of time. Investors/creditors benefit as well because 
capital markets ensure greater transparency of the issuer compared to a situation in which the 
creditor deals directly with the debtor. Although the majority of MFIs currently operates 
outside financial markets, a complete reversal of this situation cannot be ruled out in the 
future. Two recent IPOs in Mexico in 2007 (2 billion USD) and in India in 2010 (1.5 billion 
USD) have surpassed all expectations and have provided these MFIs with an enormous 
increase in both the number of clients as well as the size of the loan portfolio (Rosenberg, 
2007; Chen et al., 2010). However, critics warn that similar activities can lead to a substantial 
increase in interest rates for microfinance clients and damage not only the good name of 
microfinance in general but also the cause for which the microfinance industry had been 
designed (Cull et al., 2009). 
 
 
2.3 Microfinance and Private Sector 
 
Commercialization of the microfinance industry allows MFIs to meet the increasing demand 
for the source of funding on the interbank market or directly from private investors. Janda et 
al. (forthcoming), Galema et al. (2011) and Janda and Svárovská (2010) have analyzed 
whether a revenue from an investment in the microfinance sector can be considered an 
alternative to a revenue from an investment into other investment instruments. Empirical 
analyses of data on microfinance funds (MIV) have not only confirmed the possibility to 
achieve an interesting revenue but also the possibility to conveniently diversify client’s 
investment portfolio. Galema et al. (2011) have also indicated that higher revenues can be 
achieved with investments into MFIs operating in Latin America where the microfinance 
sector is sufficiently developed. 
Commercialization of the microfinance sector represents an opportunity for government 
authorities to reduce the amount of subsidies intended as a support of this sector. However, 
individual states do not regularly publish the amount of these subsidies. In addition, MFIs 
themselves have sometimes a tendency to misinterpret or conceal the amount of subsidies 
received (Nawaz, 2010). To be more specific, we present a general overview of the size of 
public expenditures and budgetary imbalance between 2006 and 2012 (Figure 3). A slight 
decrease in government debt in the recent years has mainly been caused by increasing prices 
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of agricultural products on commodity markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: General Overview of Government Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean  
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Some available conclusions regarding the expedience of subsidies have indicated that existing 
microfinance sector is considerably dependent on subsidies (or is 'over-subsidized'), which 
puts pressure on financial efficiency of MFIs in the long-term (Nawaz, 2010; Pati, 2009). 
Using government subsidies to finance business activities of MFIs can only be justified with 
institutions which are unable to raise funds on the interbank market or do not posses internal 
funds. Morduch (1999) and Hudon and Traca (2011) state that subsidies ought to be closely 
related to the needs of MFIs and should not exceed a certain threshold beyond which the 
inefficiency starts to manifest itself. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) and Caudill et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that MFIs financed by internal sources (deposits) are characterized by a higher 
social efficiency and are also more efficient in managing costs in comparison with MFIs 
which rely solely on social capital. Ghosh and Tassel (2013) suggest allocating subsidies into 
the microfinance sector only if there is limited supply of other sources of funding. If the 
number of other sources is sufficiently high, it is much more efficient to fund MFIs with 
loans. 
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Table 1 shows the development of the number of MFIs in selected countries of Latin 
America which depend on subsidies. The level of dependency is demonstrated by index FSS 
(Financial Self-Sufficiency). The advantages and disadvantages of FSS are discussed by Pati 
(2009), Yaron and Manos (2007). Overall, the table confirms that the level of financial self-
sufficiency of MFIs has not been improving significantly. The difference between the total 
number of MFIs (Total) and those institutions financially self-sufficient (FSS) is only 
decreasing in Bolivia in the long-term. At the same time we may observe that the share of 
MFIs dependent on subsidies rises extremely following a financial crisis when microfinance 
markets exhibited high percentage of risk and unpaid credits accompanied by a drop in 
revenue of realized business transactions. Table 1 also captures index OSS (Operational Self-
Sufficiency) monitoring the ability of MFIs to cover operating costs by revenue. This area is 
also dominated by MFIs operating in Bolivia. In contrast, a large number of MFIs which are 
not capable of covering their operating costs in the long-term can be found in Mexico. 
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Table 1: Financial and Operational Self-Sustainability (2007-2012) 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Country FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total FSS OSS Total 
Bolivia 18 22 25 21 25 25 17 20 24 18 21 25 19 22 26 15 19 24 18 18 21 
Brazil 4 8 11 5 7 30 15 24 31 12 18 24 12 20 28 9 21 29 9 13 17 
Ecuador 27 35 46 30 38 48 29 44 48 26 38 49 37 43 48 35 45 46 16 39 42 
Honduras 10 13 15 8 13 16 8 11 18 5 10 22 10 15 25 10 16 24 5 17 21 
Mexico 19 20 36 24 30 54 23 28 53 20 27 55 29 36 63 24 33 59 4 34 57 
Peru 39 48 54 41 46 63 46 55 61 48 52 60 35 52 60 38 49 61 41 39 51 
Source: www.mixmarket.org 
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Alternative ways of credit funding has been on the rise in the last six years (Figure 4). 
Between 2007 and 2012 MFIs operating in Latin America had borrowed 255.4 billion USD 
(mixmarket.org) from creditors. The biggest year-to-year increase came in 2012 when MFIs 
in Columbia borrowed 142 billion USD and MFIs in Ecuador 102 billion USD. The size of 
government loans had increased from 151.6 million USD to 14.9 billion USD during the same 
period of time. In 2012 MFIs in Ecuador had borrowed the largest sum from the government. 
The total sum amounted to 13.9 billion USD. The value of government loans and the total 
amount of government funding for 2012 is demonstrated on Y-axis. Apart from a standard 
loan - which is still the most frequent form of financing - other ways of debt financing such as 
bonds, bank overdrafts or subordinated debt have been increasing. Their usability is, 
nevertheless, rather marginal when compared to standard loans. 
 
 
Figure 4: Funding Structure in Latin America and the Caribbean (2007-2012) 
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2.4 Microfinance and Macroeconomic development 
 
The relation between microfinance performance and macroeconomic environment is 
confirmed by Janda and Zetek (2014), Imai et al. (2012), Kazi and Leonard (2012), Ahlin et 
al. (2011), Vanroose (2007) and Ahlin and Lin (2006). MFIs are in this respect positively 
influenced primarily by the GDP growth and their development proves to be more efficient in 
the regions with lower share of industry and higher inflation rate. In this regards, Janda a 
Zetek (2014) point at the significant importance of growing population in rural areas that 
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leads to lowering of interest rates from microloans and growing share of agricultural 
production which boosts the MFIs profitability. However, the conclusions up to now do not 
sufficiently cover the topic of increasing public expenditures and increasing public debt of 
developing countries. Therefore we will focus on these in the following parts. 
 
3. Data 
 
The regression model with fixed and random effects is applied on panel data containing 
information concerning MFIs based in the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Peru. This data is regularly published on the mixmarket.org portal. The 
macroeconomic data for individual countries are downloaded from IMF, OECD or World 
Bank. The complete list of variables is listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: General description of the variables (2006-2012) 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std.dev. Median 
5th 
%ile 
95th 
%ile 
GDP Gross domestic product (% change) 84 4.4929 2.8289 4.4705 -1.1295 8.8775 
Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices (% 
change) 
84 6.1978 3.3151 5.5795 1.8953 11.488 
Rural Rural population (% of total population) 84 31.171 12.489 32.677 7.8927 51.019 
Export Export volume of goods and services (% 
change) 
84 4.3377 7.1951 4.5320 -10.755 14.747 
Expenditure General government total expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
84 27.284 7.8235 27.605 14.385 40.215 
Debt General government gross debt (% of 
GDP) 
84 40.517 19.772 36.041 20.087 81.610 
TA_MI Total assets of microfinancial 
institutions (USD) 
84 15.663 1.0681 15.600 13.467 17.489 
Yield_R Yield on gross loan portfolio (real)  84 27.777 14.313 25.340 9.8775 64.520 
PAR_90 Portfolio at risk 90 days (%) 84 2.9770 1.2920 2.7050 1.4350 5.9025 
Number_B Number of active borrowers  84 8.6317 1.0267 9.0035 6.5500 9.8123 
TA_BA Total assets of banking industry (USD) 84 24.882 1.7861 24.378 22.532 28.498 
Source: mixmarket.org, oecd.org, imf.org, worldbank.org, bankscope database. 
 
The GDP indicator represents an annual change of gross domestic product. This indicator will 
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be used as a proxy variable representing the each country’s economy development level. The 
higher the GDP the greater the size of the country’s microfinance sector is expected. The 
second macroeconomic indicator, Inflation, represents an annual price level change. The 
Rural indicator captures the share of population living in the countryside. The higher the rural 
population the faster the development of microfinance market is expected. The Export 
variable serves as a proxy for each country’s degree of economic openness. It is expected that 
the more open the state is towards foreign investors, the cheaper the sources of finance for 
MFIs should be available, thus their development should be also faster. The next variable, 
Expenditure, stands for the volume of public sector expenditures spent by the government of 
the given country for various goods and services. This indicator will be used as a proxy for 
the size of public expenditures flowing to microfinance sector. Debt as the last independent 
variable represents the level of indebtedness as a percentage of GDP. The growing share of 
public sector debt presents a threat for the microfinance sector as it worsens the country’s 
credibility and can exert an upward pressure on the prices of external sources of financing for 
MFIs. 
The total assets of MFIs (TA_MI) will be used as a dependent variable expressing the size 
of the microfinance sector. Similarly we will find out whether the increasing public 
expenditures influence risk operations (PAR_90) and social efficiency of MFIs (Number_B). 
The Number_B variable represents the number of active debtors who own some form of 
microloan at given MFI. This indicator is often used as a proxy for MFIs social efficiency. 
The last indicator, TA_BA, captures the sum of total banking sector assets. Via this variable 
we will try to figure out what is the influence of public expenditures on the banking sector. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
For the above mentioned variables we construct a general regression equation 1.1, where 
independent variables: GDP, Inflation, Rural, Export, Expenditure and Debt in time t and in 
the country c will always be on the left side. The correlation matrix of independent variables 
is described in the Table 3.  
 
 
Ytc =α0 + β1GDPtc + β2Inflationtc + β3Ruraltc +  β4Exporttc +  β5Expendituretc +  β6Debttc +  εtc.
    (1.1) 
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The dependent variables TA_MI, Yield_R, PAR_90, Number_B a TA_BA will be analyzed 
gradually on the right side of the equation 1.1. The aim of the paper is to find out whether the 
macroeconomic environment together with Expenditure and Debt indicators influence the size 
of the microfinance sector, the number of debtors, profits from portfolios, risk operations and 
size of the banking sector. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
    (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(0) GDP 1           
(1) Inflation 0.0932 1         
(2) Rural -0.2283 0.1348 1       
(3) Export 0.4754 0.0596 0.0137 1     
(4) Expenditure -0.1342 0.1434 -0.4924 -0.0494 1   
(5) Debt -0.1017 0.2341 -0.2546 0.1853 0.4698 1 
 
Similarly we will determine another general regression equation 1.2 where the influence of 
chosen independent variables in time t-1 will be considered. It is appropriate to take into 
account the macroeconomic variables, which can influence the dependent variable with 
certain time delay. 
 
Ytc= α0 + β1GDPt-1c + β2Inflationt-1c + β3Ruralt-1c + β4Exportt-1c + β5Expendituret-1c + β6Debtt-
1c + εt-1c.                         (1.2) 
 
5. Results 
The final results are captured in the Tables  4 and 5 in the Annex. For each dependent variable 
the values for Fixed model with robust estimation FEt / Random model REt are listed first 
(Table 4) and followed by the results for the same regression with modified independent 
variables according to the equation 1.2 with the labels FEt-1 a REt-1 (Table 5). 
The policy of growing public expenditures has a positive impact on the future 
development of the microfinance market. Additional growth of the Expenditure indicator is 
associated with 5% (p = 0.0063) increase in size of total MFI assets. Moreover, the public 
expenditures demonstrate to be financially efficient from the long term perspective as they 
increase the real yield on gross loan portfolio of MFIs (p= 0.0002). On the contrary the size of 
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total assets proves to be surprisingly decreasing in the case of increasing share of rural 
population (Rural). The possible reason is the increasing competition on the market and 
downward pressure on the microloans prices. At the same time we have to take into 
consideration a lower purchasing power of the rural population when compared to urban 
population. In conclusion, the panel regression did not prove that the growth of public 
expenditures has significant impact on the banking sector development. 
The indicator of public debt (Debt) shows also ambiguous results. This indicator is 
relatively significantly associated with the growth of borrowers MFIs’ portfolio (β = 0.0135). 
However, we suppose that the final result is rather caused by growing public expenditures 
than by actual rate of indebtedness of the given country. As no other statistically significant 
conclusions were identified, we recommend undergoing public debt further scientific scrutiny.  
The analysis of macroeconomic variables confirms the higher rate of social efficiency of 
those MFIs that are based in the countries with higher GDP growth. The additional economic 
growth is associated with 3.7% increase of number of borrowers (p = 0.0089) in the credit 
portfolio of MFIs. The association between GDP growth and MFIs financial effectiveness was 
not confirmed, however. The Rural and Export indicators also yield satisfactory results. Their 
growth is associated with the decrease of rate of portfolio at risk (PAR_90). The rural 
population represents a certain rate of uncertainty for the banking sector as an additional 
increase in number of citizens living in the countryside leads to significant decrease of the 
size of the banking sector (TA_BA). Here the difference between microfinance and 
commercial banking is confirmed again.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The panel data regression has confirmed that public expenditures have positive impact on the 
development of microfinance sector in the Latin America region. To be more precise, the 
representative sample of MFIs shows a growing volume of total assets and real yield of gross 
loan portfolio. The ambiguous results are shown for the public sector debt of the country, 
which can manifest in the growth of active MFIs’ debtors in the long term. We assume that 
the increasing state expenditures are the reason rather than the public debt indicator itself. For 
this reason it is deemed appropriate that forthcoming studies will focus on the importance of 
growing government indebtedness and its future impact on the microfinance development. 
The macroeconomic development shows to be an important factor of the microfinance 
field progress. The states with higher growth of GDP are characterized by higher rate of social 
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efficiency. The positive influence on microfinance is also associated with growth of rural 
population or economy openness of the given country. 
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Annex 1 
 
Table 4: Final Results (t) 
 
  TA_MI Yield_R PAR_90 Number_B TA_BA 
  FEt REt FEt REt FEt REt FEt REt FEt REt 
constant 21.7117*** 14.4864 -9.4602 38.6102*** 21.0259** 3.3134** 10.3046*** 7.7786*** 39.2257*** 32.2307*** 
  (0,000004) (0,000005) (0.7054) (0.0067) (0.0178) (0.0389) (0.000006) (0.000003) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
GDP 0.0280 -0.0173 -0.0842 0.1054 -0.0113 -0.1002 0.0370*** 0.0172 0.0022 -0.0361** 
  (0,3018) (0.5019) (0.7173) (0.6476) (0.8977) (0.1051) (0.0089) (0.3685) (0.8082) (0.0244) 
Inflation 0.0121 -0.0096 -0.8803*** -0.8300*** -0.0273 -0.0291 0.0177 0.0056 0.0043 -0.0048 
  (0.2208) (0.6235) (0.00002) (0.000008) (0.4604) (0.5221) (0.1112) (0.6978) (0.5093) (0.6876) 
Rural -0.2506*** 0.0057 1.1759 -0.1893 -0.5387** 0.0059 -0.0904 0.0132 -0.4483*** -0.2325*** 
  (0.0033) (0.8011) (0.1309) (0.5064) (0.0168) (0.8084) (0.1823) (0.4963) (0.00002) (0.00001) 
Export -0.0017 0.0126 -0.0227 -0.1019 -0.0676* -0.0334 -0.0047 0.0008 -0.0054 0.0081 
  (0.8277) (0.1652) (0.7747) (0.2107) (0.0552) (0.1219) (0.3971) (0.9005) (0.1397) (0.1487) 
Expenditure 0.0582*** 0.0590 0.3203 0.0766 -0.0323 0.0049 0.0221 0.0133 -0.0078 0.0138 
  (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.2810) (0.7098) (0.5791) (0.8844) (0.2896) (0.4109) (0.5231) (0.3535) 
Debt -0.0005 -0.0130 -0.0548 -0.0471 0.0034 0.0030 0.0071 -0.0009 -0.0042 -0.0080 
  (0.9260) (0.0684) (0.7558) (0.5017) (0.9143) (0.7912) (0.3111) (0.8699) (0.2113) (0.1172) 
R
2
 0.9095   0.9490   0.5142   0.9386   0.9932   
Hausman test 0.00003 0.0183 0.0036 0.0001 0.000004 
Notes: p-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 % levels. 
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Annex 2 
 
Table 5: Final Results (t-1) 
 
  TA_MI Yield_R PAR_90 Number_B TA_BA 
  FEt-1 REt-1 FEt-1 REt-1 FEt-1 REt-1 FEt-1 REt-1 FEt-1 REt-1 
constant 19.3899*** 13.8371*** -17.3821 25.8885* 15.1684** 2.5563 9.4260*** 7.3400*** 38.2796*** 32.6786*** 
  (0.00006) (0.000004) (0.3651) (0.0877) (0.0431) (0.1730) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
GDP 0.0058 -0.0241 -0.0087 0.0496 -0.0246 -0.0600 0.0179 0.0043 0.0106 -0.0130 
  (0.8284) (0.3671) (0.9707) (0.8468) (0.7017) (0.4029) (0.2185) (0.8239) (0.1783) (0.3444) 
Inflation -0.0006 -0.0166 0.1309 0.1183 -0.0027 0.0116 0.0103 0.0020 0.0068* 0.0012 
  (0.9743) (0.3746) (0.3400) (0.5112) (0.9691) (0.8155) (0.3556) (0.8846) (0.0970) (0.8973) 
Rural -0.1919*** 0.0142 0.6863 -0.3270 -0.3197* 0.0142 -0.0699 0.0156 -0.4221*** -0.2506*** 
  (0.0075) (0.5851) (0.2301) (0.2845) (0.0964) (0.6179) (0.2987) (0.5112) (0.00003) (0.000003) 
Export 0.0093 0.0162 -0.0242 -0.0579 0.0088 0.0219 0.0033 0.0061 -0.0043 0.0026 
  (0.3700) (0.1124) (0.7519) (0.5515) (0.7761) (0.4293) (0.6116) (0.4058) (0.1818) (0.6130) 
Expenditure 0.0741*** 0.0685*** 0.7315** 0.3864* -0.0245 0.0221 0.0257 0.0187 -0.00007 0.0172 
  (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0214) (0.0845) (0.6994) (0.5776) (0.1360) (0.2703) (0.9951) (0.1839) 
Debt 0.0070 -0.0064 0.0762 0.0228 -0.0314 -0.0094 0.0135** 0.0061 -0.0031 -0.0063 
  (0.2069) (0.3983) (0.4656) (0.7663) (0.1390) (0.4810) (0.0366) (0.3006) (0.2154) (0.1616) 
R
2
 0.9148   0.9537   0.4496   0.9469   0.9957   
Hausman test 0.0003 0.0276 0.2483 0.0172 0.00001 
Notes: p-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 % levels. 
